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Social impact bonds are an increasingly popular method of unlocking typical social 
investment barriers and fuelling social innovation. This feasibility study aims to understand 
whether a social impact bond is a suitable tool for decreasing unnecessary foster care 
placements in Portugal, which have been proven to cause significant social and financial 
damage to societies. This research question is answered through a financial model which 
combines the costs of this social problem with Projecto Família’s intervention model, a 
leading intensive family preservation service. Main findings suggest using SIB funding for a 
5-year project with the goal of generating the proper impact measurement metrics lacking in 
the field. 
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Section 1: Understanding Social Impact Bonds and SIB feasibility studies 
 
Social organizations as innovators with outdated business models 
 
In a world where societies face complex and often deeply-rooted social problems, third sector 
organizations have risen to become great vehicles of impact, tackling these issues through 
their ability to innovate, either by testing and rolling-out new programs or replicating best 
practices from established intervention models across the world.  
However, the business models and management methodologies used by these social 
organizations generally have not seen the same level of innovation as the social programs 
being delivered to communities, which explains why so many countries today have their 
entire social sector largely dependent on grants, donations and governmental agreements 
(Bridges Ventures, “Choosing Social Impact Bonds”, 2014). 
The role of the government and standard service delivery contracts 
 
Working as natural partners of social organizations due to their common goal of helping local 
communities, governments have been trying to do more with the same or fewer resources 
despite increasingly tight public budgets. However, because the majority of available funding 
is channeled directly to help those in need, little room tends to remain for investing in 
preventive services. This perpetuates rooted social problems, since the lack of a long-term 
investment strategy often prevents the government from funding programs that tackle its 
main causes, compromising future generations (Laboratório de Investimento Social, 2015.”A 
Blueprint for a Nascent Social Investment Market”).  
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Working to reach their shared objectives, agents from social and public sectors traditionally 
cooperate through service delivery contracts signed with a ‘fee for service’ structure, which 
inevitably discourages efficiency and innovation on two important levels: first of all, by not 
linking revenues with results, the contract generates a clear incentive to not go beyond 
predefined goals. Second and arguably more troublesome than the latter, is the fact that 
payments tend to be based on outputs rather than outcomes, when outcomes are the ultimate 
goals that outputs aim to produce. This is a problem because it creates a direct risk for the 
contractor by forcing him to pay, regardless of the results of the service provided. For an 
example that facilitates distinguishing outputs from outcomes, please refer to Appendix 1. 
The social sector’s slow movement towards a results-oriented culture 
 
While the status quo of the last decades was far from efficient, the future of the social sector 
looks quite promising. Frustrated with the inefficient results of the past, governments and 
private donors, such as philanthropic foundations, are moving towards outcome-based 
payments. Social service providers are taking the first steps in order to adapt to the investor’s 
mindset, which will allow them to obtain capital and more easily test new intervention models 
and scale up, while investors are also slowly starting to look for projects with both financial 
and social returns on investment.  
 
The Portuguese social sector and the social market gap 
 
According to Instituto Nacional de Estatística, between Instituições particulares de 
solidariedade social (IPSS’s), non-governmental organizations and non-profit associations, 
the social economy in Portugal is comprised of over 55.000 organizations, most of which 
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operate through financially unsustainable business models that do not meet their financing 
needs (R. Franco, 2015 “Diagnóstico das ONG em Portugal”). These models inevitably push 
organizations to focus on the very short-term in order to meet fundraising targets and secure 
wages for the following months, preventing them from focusing on their social mission. 
Typical examples are 100% donation and grant-based revenue strategies to provide services 
for clients with low purchasing power. 
Lack of coordination and impact measurement 
 
Under these conditions, it is not surprising to see that there is little evidence of coordination 
or economies of scale throughout the third sector. This lack of focus on the social mission 
tends to scatter organizations, leading to weak communication and overlapping activities 
between similar service providers (Laboratório de Investimento Social, 2015.”A Blueprint 
for a Nascent Social Investment Market”). Considering the fact that it is not rare for some of 
these organizations to work with the same target populations, reliably estimating the real 
impact generated by each individual program becomes nearly unfeasible, especially since 
impact measurement already tends to be deprioritized due to a lack of financial and technical 
resources.  
The funding gap in social investment markets 
 
Unable to analyze proper impact metrics, social investors struggle to understand which social 
service providers are truly investment-ready, resulting in a typical case of market failure: 
social investors want to finance efficient programs, therefore there is enough supply, and 
social organizations are desperate for funding, which evidently implies there is sufficient 
demand as well. Nevertheless, the conditions for the final handshake remain out of reach – 
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supply and demand remain unmatched due to language barriers and the inefficiency of 
existing financial products that meet the needs of both parties. A self-reinforcing loop is at 
play: the lack of cash reserves forces organizations to focus on fundraising instead of working 
on improving efficiency and impact measurement, which in turn is exactly what prevents 
investors from providing them with the capital they could use to improve their programs 
(Bridges Ventures, “Choosing Social Impact Bonds”, 2014). Due to its own budgetary 
constraints, the government has revealed to be too risk-averse to replace the role of these 
social investors, meaning that the market gap needs to be addressed through third parties, and 
that is where financial intermediaries, capacity building and innovative financial tools come 
into the equation, addressed briefly in appendix 2. 
The social impact bond as a stakeholder alignment tool 
 
A social impact bond (SIB) is a relatively new1 investment tool designed to remove some of 
the barriers that prevent social investment from taking place. It does so by aligning the 
objectives of three parties: the investor, which provides capital upfront and expects social 
and financial returns on investment; the service provider, which uses the capital to deliver its 
program to target beneficiaries; and the outcome payer, who only pays investors back after 
an independent evaluator shows evidence that the intended results were achieved.  
The outcome payer tends to be a country’s government, and is the one to define the outcomes 
it is willing to pay for. Recalling the difference between outputs and outcomes; outputs tend 
to be activities such as the number of hours of training provided, while outcomes tend to be 
goals at the end of the impact chain such as number of successful job placements.  
                                                          
1 The first social impact bond was launched by Social Finance in 2010. 
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The service provider is usually a social organization with a strong intervention model that 
shows promising results in dealing with a relevant social issue, and the investor can be any 
appropriate entity or private donor with the capital to fund the program until completion, 
absorbing all the risk and incurring the loss if the outcome targets are not met.  
Both the achievement of desired outcomes and the impact of the entire program are 
independently measured by an external evaluator, to promote accuracy and transparency. 
 
According to Impact Investing Australia, there are currently over thirty social impact bonds 
operating in the UK alone, and more than one-hundred in the design phase worldwide. The 
credibility and versatility of this particular model is gaining strong momentum, to the point 
where it is now being used for widely different purposes, from funding state-of-the-art pilot 
programs, such as Portugal’s recently launched “Academia de Código” project to improve 
primary education, or the “pay-for-success” model applied in the United States, where SIBs 
are used to massively scale up successful programs with a strong proof of concept after being 
properly evaluated through randomized control trials. 
By attaching payments to outcomes instead of outputs, SIBs do more than provide funding 
for innovative social projects – they effectively nudge organizations to behave as they would 
if selling directly to consumers: improving their value propositions and encouraging well-
structured processes such as the performance management systems that the social sector is in 
dire need of.  
This feasibility study assesses whether a social impact bond is an appropriate model to 
provide additional funding to one of Portugal’s leading Intensive Family Preservation 
Services (IFPS), Projecto Família. Managed by Movimento Defesa da Vida (MDV) and 
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based on the classic Homebuilders model developed in the US during the 1970’s. Its goal is 
simple and clear to everyone in the organization: to work together with families so parents 
are able to retain custody of their children, avoiding institutionalizations whenever possible 
under the belief that both parents and children tend to be better-off by staying together. 
Methodology overview for a social impact bond feasibility study 
 
Feasibility studies can be summarized as a logical, sequential set of questions and answers. 
When developing them, researchers have two main goals: to understand if a SIB is a valid 
tool to tackle an entrenched social problem, and if so, to suggest different scenarios on how 
that SIB could be structured and why. The flowcharts below2 summarize the entire process, 
which naturally became the foundation for the format of this work project.  
 
 
Chart #1: the social impact bond feasibility study framework 
                                                          
2 The presented methodology was developed by Social Finance UK. 
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Chart #2: Projecto Família’s feasibility study agenda for 2015  
 
Section 2: The socioeconomic costs of avoidable foster care placement in Portugal 
 
The Portuguese foster care system 
 
A brief look into the reality of the Portuguese foster care system is required in order to 
properly discuss what avoidable foster care placement really means. According to CASA’s 
(Caracterização Anual da Situação de Acolhimento das crianças e jovens) latest report from 
Instituto da Segurança Social, 21433 children and teenagers entered the Portuguese foster 
care system during 2014. Adding beneficiaries who started receiving shelter prior to 2014, 
the latest number of registered users in the system is close to 8470 members. 
While the total number of users in the Portuguese foster care system has decreased 
approximately 31% in the last ten years, this fact is unfortunately not a sign of a disappearing 
social problem but instead one of budgetary constraints and a push for alternative solutions 
that do not require institutionalized foster care. The reality is clear and backed by workers in 
the field: the number of new children and teenagers registered annually into foster care has 
been constantly near the system’s maximum capacity as shown in the graph below. 
                                                          

























Graph #1: Key numbers of the Portuguese foster care system for 2014 
Dominant foster care solutions for the institutionalized youth 
 
Whenever an entity rules in favor of child removal (typically a judge), there are two main 
options for out-of-home placement in Portugal: Lar de Infância e Juventude (LIJ) homes, 
which accommodate 63.6% of all beneficiaries, and Centro de Acolhimento Temporário 
(CAT) centers, which provide a shorter-term shelter to 24.3% of all institutionalized children. 
Together, these responses sheltered 87.9% of all children in out-of-home placement during 
2014.  
Centros de Acolhimento Temporário (CAT) have not one, but two main goals. Besides 
assuring that the basic needs of every child and teenager are met and their rights remain 
properly protected, these centers are responsible for the development of a “projecto de vida” 
for every child or teenager it accommodates. Life-projects are created by studying and 
diagnosing the educational, socioeconomic and medico-psychological situation of the foster 
care patient, with the goal of setting short and long-term life goals that generate motivation 
and help beneficiaries look beyond their current circumstances. As the name implies, the 
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long-term shelter has led many centers to accommodate users for periods up to 2 years 
(CASA’s report for 2013). Still, CAT centers work to prepare their users for the day when 
they will return to their core families, as long as safety and psycho-affective requirements 
are met. If these conditions are not verified, placement within a different family is attempted. 
If both options fail, permanent foster care or, more desirably, the transition to a fully 
independent life, are the remaining options, with the latter only being available upon 
achieving very positive feedback in rigorous and mandatory autonomy-preparation modules. 
The second mainstream solution is the Lar de Infância e Juventude (LIJ) foster home, which 
was created for children and teenagers requiring long-term housing. Despite its long-term 
nature, every user is periodically interviewed in order to understand if there are valid needs 
justifying his continued placement.  
LIJ homes aim to provide a living experience as close to what these children had before they 
were separated from their families, so that their life-project goals can be achieved and their 
psychological, social and educational development is assured. This requires the presence of 
a multidisciplinary team, with two additional elements not required in CAT centers: one to 
focus on the medium to long-term evolution of every patient, and a second to provide 
improved health care services.  
Providing shelter to 5.388 (63.6%) of all children and teenagers in foster care, long-term 
placement in LIJ homes is undoubtedly the dominant long-term solution in the Portuguese 







Similarly to previous years, the districts of Lisbon (1.602 -18.9%), Oporto (1.568 – 18.5%) 
and Braga (613 – 7.2%), lead the ranks of areas with the highest number of foster care users. 
Most of these users (56.2% - 4.753) are teenagers aged between 12 and 17 years old, while 
children between 0 and 11 only account for about one third (31.3% - 2.662) of the target 
population. Older users aged between 18 and 20 are clearly a minority, accounting for the 
last 12.5%.  
Regarding nationalities, data from 2013 shows that 84%4 of the beneficiaries were identified 
as Portuguese. The remaining 16% were mainly split among Guinea-Bissau (3.1%), Cape 
Verde (2.9%), Angola (2.1%) and the Romani ethnicity (1.3%). 
Common risk factors 
 
Looking at the main triggers that motivate child removal processes, one can immediately see 
a field clearly dominated by abandonment and varied forms of negligence, with 60% of all 
child removal processes beginning because parents left their children alone or uncared for 
large periods of time, especially among children between 4 and 11 years old. The second 
most common risk factor (identified as grounds for removal in 35% of all interventions) was 
exposure to undesirable parenting models, where at least one adult consistently acts as an 
inadequate role model, promoting anti-social and/or development-hindering behavior, 
regardless of his or her intention to do so. The third and fourth common factors of misconduct 
were education (32%) and health-related (30%) forms of negligence. These are good news 
for preventive services, because they imply that most child removals are not triggered by 
                                                          
4 Nationalities were only available in CASA’s report for 2013. 
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extreme, untreatable situations, such as physical or sexual abuse. Adding the fact that these 
numbers have held relatively constant over time has allowed IFPS organizations to prevent 
avoidable removals by specializing on techniques to deal with parental negligence. 
Length of stay, previous measures and rate of return 
 
Regarding how long most minors typically stay in foster care homes, and how often they are 
forced to return after leaving, exits from 2014 show that 31.5% of all users stayed for less 
than 1 year, 47.5% were housed between 1 and 3 years, and the remaining 21% received 
shelter for more than 3 years. Naturally, these numbers are key once the focus shifts to the 
financial implications of preventable placement in foster care, due to the high monthly cost 
associated with each user. Unfortunately, the same report also indicates that 80.8% of all 
users are on their second form of foster care response, which implies that a vast majority of 
CAT center beneficiaries remain unable to return to their families or live autonomously after 
the maximum housing period of 6 months, and are then left with little choice but to be 
transferred to long-term LIJ homes. Finally, analyzing the subset of users that successfully 
left the system is the past, 11% of all users currently receiving care are returning members 
that once were deemed ready for autonomy or a return to their core family.  
The social problem tree: key causes and effects of avoidable placement in foster care 
 
After a thorough look into the Portuguese foster care system it becomes much easier to 
understand what unnecessary placement in foster care entails, along with its implications. 
Avoidable or unnecessary placement in foster care occurs whenever removing children from 
their current home will undoubtedly cause more harm than good due to the existence of a 
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more efficient alternative. A typical example provided by Projecto Família workers is that of 
the abusive father engaging in domestic violence towards his wife in front of his children. 
Once signaling entities become aware, child removal services visit the household, which 
often ends with the minors being placed in foster care instead of receiving temporary housing 
for both themselves and their mother. This results in an avoidable separation with dire effects 
for the mother and her children.  
Combining previous data from the social problem with the field experience of Projecto 









Chart #3: Social problem tree diagram: main causes and effects 
 
Key causes: weak business models and parental neglect 
 
The fact that the leading IFPS (Intensive Family Preservation Services) in Portugal rely on 
donations and cooperation agreements5 with the government already demonstrates how 
                                                          
5 According to Projecto Família’s Executive Director. 
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unsustainable these models are at the moment: IFPS organizations are not able to generate 
direct revenues to finance the cost of their services. This creates a strong barrier that prevents 
these organizations from scaling up, regardless of their experience in the field, since 
providing a superior service and capturing demand for that service do not generate additional 
income. The result is an inability to serve more users than the yearly budget allows for, 
resulting in long waiting lists. As previously mentioned, the main triggers of child removals 
are a lack of supervision and other forms of parental neglect, which are among the softest 
removal triggers when compared to physical or sexual abuse, making them much easier to 
prevent through IFPS and thus important sources of avoidable institutionalizations.  
Main effects of out-of-home placement in foster care 
 
For most of the twentieth century, little was known about the real long-term impact of foster 
care placement. Experts in the field knew the reality was harsh, but according the Institute of 
Research on Poverty a study led by T. McDonald et al. (1993) demonstrated that most classic 
papers lacked either significant samples or proper econometric methodologies. It was only 
within the last 20 years that significant bodies of work started to arrive to the field. Perhaps 
the most popular and sensationalized of them all was a study led by K. Williams from the 
UK’s Ministry of Justice in 2012, which garnered strong media attention when David 
Cameron quoted one of its findings, which suggests that nearly one out of every four UK 
prisoners has previously been placed in foster care. This finding was consistent across the 
world, since a 2008 state-wide survey conducted by the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation found a lower but equally significant estimate of 14% among surveyed 
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inmates. While these findings are mere correlations and do not imply causality, they 
undeniably hint at the known link between foster care and marginalization, and brought 
additional attention to the research question at hand.  
One of the most relevant bodies of work was led by MIT’s J. Doyle (2007), which specifically 
aimed to measure the long-term consequences of foster care for its users. Leveraging the fact 
that each child protection investigator showed different tendencies to rule in favor or against 
institutionalization, Doyle was able to focus on cases of children at risk of removal that were 
“randomly” removed from their families according to the subjective preferences of each 
investigator in the sample. The children who were able to remain with their families formed 
a control group and those who were institutionalized created the treatment group. Doyle then 
proceeded to look for significant differences in long-term outcomes for each group, namely 
delinquency, teenage pregnancy and employment. The results suggest that the control group 
had a higher likelihood of achieving better outcomes among the subset of children whose 
conditions made it very hard to rule towards removal or preservation. This link corroborates 
the experience of family support workers working in IFPS, and further highlights removal 
prevention-based services as a superior solution with higher potential for improving the lives 
of children and youth at risk. 
Financial Implications 
 
When combining the macro numbers of the Portuguese foster care system with Social 
Security’s latest cooperation protocol, which fixed a minimum monthly amount of 700 Euros 
in financial support per child or teenager in CAT/LIJ out-of-home placement, the financial 
dimension of this social problem starts to become clearer. A single month of shelter for every 
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user in the system during 2014 led to an expenditure of over 5.93 million Euros, a figure even 
more relevant when recalling that 48% of all users that left the system during that year were 
accommodated between 1 and 3 years.  
Additional positive externalities6 with the potential to generate financial benefits include 
improvements on the physical and emotional health of both parents and children, higher 
school engagement, and increases in both income and hours of training received by working 
members in the family (Welsh Government Social Research, 2014). Even though these 
indirect outcomes carry medium to long-term social and financial benefits, they were 
purposely left out of the value-for-money model described in section 4, in order to decrease 
the complexity and uncertainty that would arise from pricing each additional outcome, 
allowing for pragmatic results. The developed financial model assesses the feasibility of a 
social impact bond in this area essentially by incorporating the monthly financial cost of 700€ 
per foster care user with Projecto Família’s intervention costs and removal prevention rate, 
returning output metrics such as investor IRR, required investment amount and number of 
prevented removals. 
  
                                                          
6 Family-reported, qualitative improvements. 
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Section 3: Projecto Família’s intervention model 
 
Launched by Movimento Defesa da Vida (MDV) back in 1996, Projecto Família (PF) has 
grown to become one of the leading IFPS (intensive family preservation services) in 
Portugal7. Its core mission is to prevent the institutionalization of children and teenagers from 
fragile families through an intensive and customized 6-week support program. The program 
operates under the field-tested assumption that as long as they receive adequate support, 
families tend to be able to develop the necessary skills in order to keep their children, 
regardless of  socioeconomic status, race, religion or other specific circumstances. PF’s 
methodology is a direct import from the US-born Families First – Homebuilders (FF-H) 
model. MDV maintains a close relationship with Michigan’s Department of Human Services 
and Seattle’s Institute for Family Development, two cases of successful large-scale FF-H 
implementations, which allow family support workers in Portugal to receive continuous 
training and technical support and guarantee that the program is constantly up to date. 
Program methodology & client journey 
 
The Families First - Homebuilders model was first developed in 1974 and has since then seen 
constant evolution. The 2014 program standards provide a clear and concise description of 
both how the PF program is structured and differentiates itself from other IFPS. The most 
relevant standards for the model8 are: working exclusively with a target population, namely 
families referred by signaling entities whose children are at a major risk of being 
institutionalized in the near future; immediate response and constant availability, 24 hours a 
                                                          
7 In both size and public sector funding. 
8  Based on the Institute for Family Development’s full program standards. 
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day, seven days a week, in order to establish a solid safety net for the family; two families 
per family support worker, to ensure availability standards and high quality support and 6-
week intervention plans with follow-ups up to a year that balance the required time to 
generate real changes in the behaviors of family members while maintaining a posture of 
urgency and intensive short-term support. This prevents its services from being taken for 
granted by families and increases commitment, while maintaining contact and measuring the 
evolution of family outcomes through follow-up meetings that allow IFPS to track changes 




A growing evidence-base highlights the model’s potential and the need for further research 
 
Family preservation programs and especially the FF-H model have been the target of a 
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Chart #4: Full client journey of a family accepted into the PF program. 




papers that looked the long-term effects of foster care, arrived to different conclusions 
regarding the true efficacy of the FF-H and other prominent models, which only attracted 
more researchers to the field and reinforced the need for proper impact measurement.  
It was only in 2009 that researchers were able to agree that there was enough encouraging 
and scientifically valid evidence in favor of IFPS models, when K. Nelson et al. published 
“A Ten Year Review of Family Preservation Research: Building the Evidence Base”. 
Analyzing the latest and most significant studies in the field, the research team was able to 
confidently suggest that organizations that closely followed the FF-H model were able to 
successfully and significantly decrease the number of child out-of-home placements when 
compared with suitable control groups, a finding that corroborated a similar analysis carried 
out three years earlier researchers from Washington State’s Institute for Public Policy titled 
“IFPS: Program Fidelity Influences Effectiveness”. The latter study further suggested that 
every dollar invested into IFPS generated benefits worth approximately 2.59$, by 
significantly decreasing child removal rates and medium-term cases of parental abuse and 
neglect. However, these financial benefits were only observed in families accompanied by 
service providers who internalized the Homebuilders model (as is the case for Projecto 
Família), since investments in IFPS that did not adhere to the model with the same level of 
rigor were unable to generate any significant effects between treatment and control groups.  
While today’s experts have generally accepted the efficacy of Homebuilders/Families-First 
based IFPS, a long road remains untraveled in order to better understand the medium and 
long-term effects of receiving these services. The most accurate studies in the field have 
focused on presenting short-term impact estimates, and both the experience of workers in the 
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field and the data obtained thus far point to a significant decay in family preservation rates 
in the first year after the initial 6 weeks of IFPS, as some families tend to return to their 
original lifestyles. This fact leaves considerable room for doubt as to whether these 
interventions are only postponing inevitable institutionalizations or can be a real source of 
long-term, positive change for the families these organizations work with. A 5-year study 
conducted by University Associates (US-based research firm) in 1995 aimed to compare 
Michigan’s implementation of the Families First methodology with the standard foster care 
services, and generated relevant data which besides highlighting the superior results 
generated by the intervention versus traditional foster care, also suggests that approximately 
three out of every four families successfully kept its children under their care in the two years 
following FF-H IFPS. This finding is in line with a more recent evaluation of the Families 
First model’s efficacy, once again based in Michigan but now led by Blythe & Jayaratne 
(2002), which found an even higher and significant difference of over 30% between treatment 
and control groups, 12 months after completion of the intervention (the study below was only 
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Graph #2: Consistent results over time show how the FF-H model tends to be more 
effective than mainstream services. 
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Regarding additional outcome metrics besides child preservation rates, one of the most recent 
evaluations of the FF-H model aimed to understand its impact with greater length and depth, 
extending the range of measured family outcomes to include insights on variables related to 
foster-care placement such as education, employment and social relationships. The initiative 
was commissioned by the Welsh government, who requested a deep evaluation of Families 
First interventions taking place between 2012 and 2015. While the study is still under 
development, data generated so far points towards clear improvements in softer outcomes 
such as the sense of an improved home environment (59%), the ability for children in families 
at risk of poverty to achieve their potential (48%) and increased parenting skills (40%). After 
an overview on the methodology and credibility of the FF-H model, a natural question arises: 
why aren’t services like Projecto Família naturally scaling up if they are internationally 
recognized as effective, cheaper and superior solutions? At heart of this question lies the link 
between each section of every SIB feasibility study: it is exactly because even top-tier social 
service providers often struggle with funding and medium-term financial sustainability that 
innovative social finance instruments such as SIB’s play such a key role in bridging the social 








The value-for-money case was developed through a financial model built on Microsoft Excel 
and is the cornerstone of the feasibility study, bringing together all the different components 
and stakeholders detailed in previous sections. The main goal of the model is to simulate the 
impact of providing additional funding to Projecto Família, especially regarding the 
estimated number of prevented institutionalizations and the cost-savings generated by those 
avoided removals, which directly imply how feasible the investment case really is and how 
attractive are the returns (if any). Please refer to Appendix 3 for key inputs and outputs of the 
model.  
From the social problem findings, the most important metric incorporated was the monthly 
cost of 700€ stated by Segurança Social as the minimum monthly support fee for every child 
or teenager sheltered at CAT and LIJ homes. Because the goal of Projecto Família and all 
stakeholders is to prevent institutionalizations, the model interprets these 700€ as a source of 
revenue in the form of cost savings generated after the intervention is delivered, as is 
traditional for social impact bonds.  
Moving on to service delivery, constant meetings with Projecto Família throughout this 
feasibility study provided the team with enough information to create an accurate 
understanding of the direct and indirect costs required for its current capacity, estimated at 
approximately 175 families per year. The organization’s client database also made it possible 
to estimate the family preservation for families that received the intervention in 2013 (the 
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year with the best available data). The estimate of 82.8% falls close to acceptable values 
found in relevant literature such as K. Nelson et al. (2009), allowing for interesting 
suggestions towards the implementation of a social impact bond in this field, which will be 
described briefly. 
The model begins with the aforementioned inputs section, which hosts financial variables 
(tax rate, debt ratio, etc.) and data on the intervention model such as direct and indirect 
delivery costs. These include performance management fees for proper impact measurement 
during and after service provisioning.  
A second sheet considers the number of FTE family support workers and supervisors as an 
input (default values use data from 2013 for consistency in the preservation rate and financial 
data) and proceeds to estimate how many child removals will be prevented over a 5-year 
period. This figure is then fed to an extensive sheet of traditional financials such as income 
and cash-flow statements. These generate estimates of key project outputs, which are: the 
number and timing of prevented out-of-home placements, total project costs and revenues, 
the initial investment required (substantially lower than total costs due to recycling revenues), 
and finally the internal rate of return (IRR) and cost/benefit multiplier per family. 
Key scenarios and sensitivity analysis 
 
The results estimated by this type of financial model forecasting are naturally dependent on 
the accuracy of revenue and cost projections, which in turn rely on an extensive dataset, 
varying from fully proven figures to assumptions deemed reasonable enough to represent 
unavailable data.  
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The following scenarios should be interpreted only as indications of probable outcomes. The 
limitations section will provide additional guidance towards how to interpret the following 
results. 
Scenario Overview: S1- Expected estimates 
Key outcome         Price          Max.               Discount 
Savings/Prevented removal  €  175.00    €  700.00                   75% 
Intervention Model Inputs       
Successful prevention rate   82.8% 
Average minimum stay   14 Months 
Average family size   2.08 
Time to outcome     12 Months 
Project Overview       
Prevented child removals   869 
Maximum contract value   €  1,871,270.45 
Total project cost   €     971,123.77 
Total Investor requirement   €     445,161.22 
Financial Outputs       
IRR   41% 
Revenues/Family   €         3,712.84 
Cost/Family    €         1,926.83  
Cost/Benefit Multiplier                        1.93  
Table #1: overview of project metrics in S1 
 





2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Project overview
Revenues Costs Cum. Net Profit
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The numbers point towards a clear recommendation in favor of using a social impact bond 
to provide additional funding to Projecto Família, as long as the aforementioned conditions 
hold. Due diligence and interpretation for these figures, along with the structure of the SIB 
are detailed in section 5. This section will now cover possible changes in uncertain values 
and their respective break-even implications. 
Scenario Overview S2: Break-even under  
pessimistic financial conditions 
Key outcome          Price         Max   Discount 
Savings/Prevented removal  €  105.00   €  700.00  85% 
Intervention Model Inputs   
Successful prevention rate 82.8% 
Avg Minimum stay  14 Months 
Average family size  2.08 
Time to outcome   12 Months 
Intervention Cost Inputs   
Maximum cost inflation to break-even  17% 
Project Overview     
Prevented child removals 869 
Maximum contract value   € 1,122,762.27 
Total project cost    € 1,122,762.27 
Total Investor requirement   €    527,676.59  
Financial Outputs     
IRR     0% 
Revenues/Family   €         2,227.70   
Cost/Family   €         2,227.70   
Cost/Benefit Multiplier 1.00 
Table #2: key project outputs in S2 
S2 and S3 are perhaps more relevant scenarios, because despite deviating from expected 
values, both provide insights onto how flexible projections can be in order for investors to 
break-even. Regarding S2, the key changes from S1 involved: the possible inclination from 
public sector officials to pay below the predicted value per outcome, in this case dropping to 
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from 25% to 15% of the full value. Maintaining all estimates derived from robust sample 
sizes, the model indicates that Projecto Família’s service delivery costs have room to increase 
up to 17% before investors incur any losses.  
Scenario Overview S3: Minimum success-rate  
under normal conditions 
Key outcome Price Max Discount 
Savings/Prevented removal  €  175.00   €  700.00  75% 
Intervention Model Inputs   
Break-even prevention rate 43.0% 
Average minimum stay  14 Months 
Average family size  2.08 
Time to outcome   12 Months 
Project Overview     
Prevented child removals 451 
Maximum contract value   €    971,121.90 
Total project cost    €    971,121.90 
Total Investor requirement   €    454,273.43 
Financial Outputs     
IRR     0% 
Revenues/Family   €         1,926.83 
Cost/Family   €         1,926,83 
Cost/Benefit Multiplier 1.00 
Table #3: key project outputs in S3 
S3 tests how low Projecto Família’s success rate may deviate under regular conditions. While 
the original figure of 82.8% was estimated from a sample of 159 children that PF worked 
with in 2013, and that figure falls close to observed values according to K. Nelson et al. 
(2009), there are substantial differences between the settings where those studies were carried 
out and Projecto Família’s local reality. The fact that the minimum, break-even prevention 
rate is nearly half of the original estimated value for families from 2013 should encourage 





Because financial models used for these projections incorporate sets of assumptions, it 
becomes relevant to understand which volatile variables have the highest impact on key 
outputs. The sensitivity analysis below shows the impact of a 1% input increase on key 
project output metrics. 
Sensitivity Analysis         
Variable       IRR Total savings  Total costs       Total investment 
Family size 2.16% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Avg. duration 2.16% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Success rate 0.883% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Direct expenses -0.06% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 
Indirect costs -0.12% 0.00% 0.09% 0.08% 
Supervisor wage -0.25% 0.00% 0.17% 0.19% 
Family worker wage -0.66% 0.00% 0.45% 0.49% 
Price of outcome -8.52% -4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table #4: the volatility of each variable on key output metrics 
The values shown above highlight the importance estimating a proper success rate and 
developing a relationship of transparency with the public sector, as these are the two variables 
with the highest uncertainty and relevant impact on the IRR. The average family size and 
duration in foster also hold naturally prominent weights due to their linear relationship with 
both IRR and cost-savings, but should be interpreted very differently: estimations over the 
course of several years through CASA’s reports show that while the average family size has 
remained relatively stable over time, the same does not hold for the length of stay in CAT/LIJ 




Section 5: Recommendations, limitations and final remarks 
 
The cost/benefit projections shown above present undoubtedly promising results. However, 
this was already expected, regardless of the exact figures. Social Finance, a leading non-
profit organization working to tackle entrenched social problems through innovative 
financing models, has stated that family preservation was one of the fields where the value-
for-money case is clearer, mainly due to the both high and easy-to-trace monthly cost per 
institutionalized child, which reinforces the added-value of effective preventive services 
(Social Finance, 2011. “A Technical Guide to Developing a Social Impact Bond: Vulnerable 
Children and Young People).  
Recommendation #1: tackle current data gaps through a pilot-program style SIB 
 
One of the most important findings of this work project arises from the fact that after 
combining all publicly available information on the social problem with Projecto Família’s 
family database there is still not enough high-quality intelligence available to make a precise 
claim towards the family preservation rate of the model in Portugal. While this does not 
invalidate Projecto Família’s ability to efficiently prevent child institutionalizations and 
generate substantial cost-savings to the Portuguese government, the ideal format for a social 
impact bond in this field inevitably needs to be centered on calculating proper impact 
measurement metrics, a model more commonly used for untested pilot programs. This means 
that instead of other possible SIB formats such those used for scaling-up efficient services, 
Projecto Família, the projected investment should be applied to fund a pilot-style SIB, with 
the ultimate goal of creating a proper evidence-base around PF and FF-H models in Portugal. 
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Recommendation #2: Leverage on Projecto Família’s previous field experience in Évora 
 
 Considering that the strategic goal for this work project is to setup the groundwork for a 
future application to Portugal Inovação Social’s 15-million Euro fund for SIB proposals, the 
added applicability of this feasibility study allowed for a concrete debate regarding possible 
structures of a SIB-funded program. An early draft regarding format and timeline holds the 
following characteristics: 
 
Chart #4: potential timeline of a pilot-program style SIB, used to prove the efficacy of 
Projecto Família’s intervention model 
 
A proper child removal rate (or family preservation rate, as they are exact opposites) should 
be estimated through the randomized control trial methodology, where the treatment group 
will be made of families working with PF, while the control group in IFPS SIBs can be made 
from families receiving standard family support services9 (such as those supplied by Santa 
Casa da Misericórdia). 
Families at risk of child removal who are identified by CPCJ and are randomly selected for 
the treatment group will receive the Projecto Família intervention, split into 3 different 
cohorts, totaling roughly 500 families. Follow-ups regarding the removal rate and evolution 
                                                          
9 Methodology used in Michigan’s Families-First Effectiveness Study 
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of the household environment should be made for a period of 2 years after the end of the 
initial 6-weeks – a period deemed long enough to provide data for a medium-term impact 
analysis. 
The ideal location for such a project appears to be Évora, not only because it is an area where 
Projecto Família has operated in previously (being forced to leave due to budgetary 
constraints), but most importantly because the local public sector has already shown interest 
in both social impact bonds and reigniting their relationship with Projecto Família. 
Circumventing data restraints 
 
Due to incomplete information, the financial model could not be structured without including 
a set of variables that force wider interpretations of results, due to their uncertain nature or 
simply unproven value. These include: the public sector’s willingness to pay a share of the 
cost-savings, included in the form of a “discount” to the full outcome valuation; Projecto 
Família’s real success rate, which was only possible to estimate for a single year (by 
analyzing the organization’s full 2013 client database and tracking how many children were 
institutionalized among all who received their services). While the database contained data 
from over 150 children, enough for significant results, this method lacks a proper treatment 
vs. control group approach that a randomized control trial can provide. The most interesting 
approach regarding success measurement is the incremental increase in the preservation rate 
of PF when compared with standard services, which was impossible to estimate. Even if it 
did not land far from expected values, an additional factor needs to be considered when 
interpreting the estimated success rate (82.5%). The foster care system has been operating at 
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full capacity10 in the last 3-5 years, which creates a strong top-down pressure to avoid or 
delay additional institutionalizations. Occasional rulings in favor of removal have seen long 
waiting periods until implemented, and some judges were reluctant to green-light otherwise 
simple cases inclined towards foster care placement. Both events erroneously inflate family 
preservation rates, but are impossible to track. The last limitation is also court-related, 
involving the number of months between the end of the PF program and the official decision 
from a court judge or CPCJ, which affects cash-flow performance and cannot be reliably 
estimated with available data due to the high variance between each case. A 12-month 
waiting period was confirmed by Projecto Família as the most reasonable value where the 
vast majority of cases has had enough time to be processed.  
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Appendix 1: Outputs versus outcomes 
 
Take a program that aims to tackle youth unemployment. Here, outputs will be simply 
program metrics, such as the number of hours of training provided to the unemployed. 
Naturally, these metrics alone do not provide information about the impact of the program, 
which in this example would be what those hours of training actually lead to, and that is why 
an outcome-based approach matters. Outcomes are the true goals stakeholders are aiming 
for, such as the number of jobs obtained after attending the training program. Paying for 
outcomes instead of outputs aligns service providers to work for the real objective, rather 
than focusing on delivering metrics detached from the project’s real purpose, which is why 
the social investment world has indisputably recognized this reward mechanism as a best 
practice to eventually fully replace the fee-for-service standard. 
 
Appendix 2: Financial intermediaries and social finance instruments 
Properly equipped to speak the language of both supply and demand, financial intermediaries 
can help social organizations by leading the shift in mindset towards a structured and impact-
driven social sector. By providing training on investment readiness, intermediaries teach 
organizations the skills required to become investment-ready and claim back the time to focus 
on their mission. The close contact with the social sector also puts these intermediaries in a 





Appendix 3: Key inputs & outputs of the SIB feasibility financial model 
 
Intervention cost inputs 
    
Direct Costs Value Staffed Monthly Estimate 
Family workers  €   1,350.00  9  €        12,150.00  
Supervisors  €   1,550.00  3  €          4,650.00  
Medical expenses  €      180.00    €             180.00  
Travelling expenses  €      594.51     €             594.51  
Mobile Communication  €        31.00    €              31.00  
Family support  €      283.00     €             283.00  
    
Indirect Costs Value Évora ratio Monthly Estimate 
Top management  €   2,000.00  20%  €             400.00  
Middle management  €   1,570.00  15%  €             235.50  
Administrative  €      770.00  100%  €             770.00  
Accounting  €      500.00  20%  €             100.00  
Office supplies  €      287.30  -  €             287.30  
Fixed communications  €      196.00  -  €             196.00  
    
Additional Services Value Évora ratio Monthly Estimate 
Psychology  €   1,325.00  100%  €          1,325.00  
Employment support  €   1,360.00  100%  €          1,360.00  
Transportation  €        88.50  -  €              88.50  
Office supplies  €        37.00  -  €              37.00  
Rent  €      600.00  -  €             600.00  
    
Performance Management Value #Months Total 
1 PM in FTE  €   1,500.00  60  €        90,000.00  
    





Intervention model inputs 
 
Program length     6 weeks 
Number of FTE family support workers 10.5 
Nº Families/worker   2 
Nº Families/year/worker   16 
Capacity assumption:  100% due to constant waiting lists 
Estimated successful prevention rate   82.8% 
Weighted avg. minimum stay  14 Months 
Avg. family size of target population     2.1 
Time to outcome   12 Months 




Required reserves     € 300,000.00  
Outcomes inflator 0% 
Debt ratio   75% 
Tax   20% 
Interest rate (Debt) 
 6% 
Cash flow delay   3 months 
Working capital contingency  € 48,556.19  
Carry   0% 
 
 
